Eugene Buy Sell Trade ((FULL))

We also make house calls! If you have a very large collection (i.e. 100+ sets) that you are interested in selling quickly and easily please give us a call or email with your contact info, location, and a picture or description of your collection and we will get back to you to promptly to schedule an inspection.

eugene buy sell trade

Copyright 2022. Free gift with purchase promotions while supplies last. LEGO is a registered trademark of the LEGO Group of companies which does not sponsor, authorize or endorse these programs or this web site. Some LEGO sets contain small parts that are NOT suitable for, and may pose a hazard to, children under 3 years of age. LEGO DUPLO sets have larger pieces which are specially designed for children under 3.

We are a buy sell trade store located in the heart of Downtown Atlanta and Snellville, GA. We provide a wide selection of premium shoes such as Jordans, Nikes & Yeezys. We also have a selection of premium streetwear such as VLone, BAPE, Supreme, ASSC & more.

We carry quality new and pre-owned cameras and accessories. Trade in or sell your older gear to get something new and exciting! Top dollar paid for digital, small, medium, and large format cameras. We also buy lenses, lighting, and accessories.

Ace Buyers is a state-licensed and full-service pawnshop in Eugene, OR, that offers fair pawn loans and great deals on a wide range of quality merchandise. They have 28 years of experience in this pawn industry, and they provide a precise appraisal of your item. They provide honest, upfront pricing to customers, whether you want to buy it or trade it, pawn it or sell an item. They have a wide range of jewelry for any occasion that fits your budget. Ace Buyers maintains their shop clean and provides great customer service with trustworthiness. They have a knowledgeable and friendly staff ready to do business with you. You can get a layaway with a flexible payment option. Ace Buyers serves 4 locations within Oregon, including Albany, Springfield, Eugene, and Eugene Downtown.

The folks at Ace Buyers on Hwy 99 are great! I came in to sell some ammo about they gave me a better price for what I was asking. They were honest and very helpful. I would highly reccomend going there and checking them out!

Northwest Pawn is one of the premier pawn shops in Eugene, OR. The traditional family-run shop provides low-interest collateral loans in the Eugene community. They have been serving in the local area for over 14 years. The shop offer loans from $5.00 to $5000.00. They offer a collateral loan for 60 days and buy and sell gold, silver jewelry, video games, and musical instruments at fair pricing. The team knows customers' money needs in a hard time, so they make their hassle-free loan process. They also have a large inventory of electronics, jewelry, and tools guns. Northwest Pawn offers free on-site appraisals.

Your local Device Pitstop store sells certified pre-owned brands of tech devices like laptops, tablets, smartphones. We also pay cash-on-the-spot for your used devices. Plus, our Pit Crew offers quick repairs and upgrades, for less.

SLANT includes short opinion pieces, observations and rumor-chasing notes compiled by the EW staff. Heard any good rumors lately? Contact Ted Taylor at 484-0519, editor at eugeneweekly dot com

This is a trade-mark and unfair competition action. The plaintiffs prayed an injunction, an accounting for gains and profits, and damages. At the conclusion of the evidence, the court entered a decree dismissing the bill for want of jurisdiction.

The opinion of the court sets forth the reasons for the decree. The court determined that the action for trade-mark infringement must be based upon section 96, title 15, US CA; that this section required three essentials to an actionable infringement of a registered trade-mark, which were (1) a reproduction or imitation of the trade-mark, (2) the affixing of such reproduction or imitation either to merchandise or to labels or receptacles used in connection with merchandise covered by the registration, and (3) the use of such reproduction or imitation in interstate commerce; that defendant had not so affixed, and had not used the reproduction in interstate commerce in connection with the sale of merchandise of the same description as covered by that of the registered trade-mark; that therefore no actionable infringement was shown under section 96.

The decisive point in this case is whether this action must be based upon section 96, title 15, USCA, or whether it may be based upon section 99 of the same title. If it must be regarded as based on section 96, the determination of the trial court was correct, for *610 the reasons following: That section clearly requires, as the court held, the concurrence of three essentials before an infringement could be maintained thereunder, and those three are as stated by the court. The appellants have argued the case here as though the trial court had found but one of those three essentials lacking, to wit, use in interstate commerce of the objectionable trade-mark. However, the court not only found that essential missing, but it also found missing another essential, which is that the defendant should have affixed the objectionable trade-mark to the package used in interstate commerce. The evidence seems clear that this finding is amply supported by the evidence, if indeed it is not conclusively shown therein. Therefore, in so far as section 96 is concerned, it would be of no avail to appellants to convince us that the use was in interstate commerce. Hence, if this action must be regarded as brought under section 96, there has been a complete failure of proof as to affixing the trade-mark, and therefore the court necessarily reached the conclusion that no recovery could be had for infringement of the trade-mark under that section. As there was a lack of necessary diversity of citizenship, the jurisdiction of the court would have to rest upon infringement of trade-mark, and a failure to establish a cause of action thereon might result in a lack of jurisdiction as to the issue of unfair competition, under the Stark Case.

However, this action not only may be regarded as brought under section 99, but it must be so treated. These two sections, as well as others, are part of the Trade-Mark Act of 1905. Sections 96, 99, 100, and 103 cover the provisions as to remedies. Section 96 is a pure action at law for damages for infringement of a trade-mark registered under the act. Not only does it fail to permit, but its very terms actually prohibit, any thought of equitable relief or remedy, since it is expressly a provision for the recovery of actual damages by a jury (with provision for trebling such in the discretion of the court). Also, it may be noted that section 99 emphasizes, expressly, that section 96 is intended to cover only "actions of law." Section 99 provides the equitable remedy for infringement of trade-marks registered under the act. In addition to injunctive relief, this section provides for recovery of profits and of damages. Section 100 deals only with the power of the court to order the destruction of infringing matter in the possession of the defendant, where the plaintiff has prevailed, either under sections 96 or 99. Section 103 declares that the above remedies are cumulative, and not exclusive of any remedy at law or in equity which existed for the protection of trade-marks. In short, it declares that there is no diminution of the remedies at common law to protect common-law trade-marks.

The question remains whether a case was established under section 99. The court found that the matter covered by the trade-mark was subject to registration as such, and that it was being used by the defendant without right. He found, also, that the defendant was not using it in connection with sales in interstate commerce. Therefore, our problem, viewing alone the findings of the court, has to do with whether it was necessary to show a use by defendant of the trade-mark in interstate commerce, and whether that was shown. Passing from the finding of the court to the evidence, there is no dispute therein as to what the defendant was doing in relation to interstate commerce. He was taking contracts for applying this Ironite waterproofing mixture to concrete walls. In these contracts, he was obligated to do the work and to use Ironite mixture. To get this Ironite mixture to the place of use, he shipped it from the place where he had received it to the place of use, in interstate commerce.

The findings of the court strongly intimate, if they do not so express the idea, that it was necessary to show a sale where delivery took place in interstate commerce. Sale is not controlling, and we need not determine whether what the defendant did constituted a sale with a delivery by interstate commerce. Federal control over trade-marks does not *611 rest upon the patent and copyright provision (article 1, 8, cl. 8) in the Constitution (Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 25 L. Ed. 550), but that power is found in the commerce clause (article 1, 8, cl. 3), as is shown by many cases, of which a late one is Macaulay v. Malt-Diastase Co., 55 App. D. C. 277, 4 F.(2d) 944. The power of Congress over interstate commerce is not limited to transportation in connection with sales, but extends to the bare act of transportation in interstate commerce. In the noted case of Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 189, 6 L. Ed. 23, Chief Justice Marshall said: "The words are, `congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.' The subject to be regulated is commerce; and our constitution being, as was aptly said at the bar, one of enumeration, and not of definition, to ascertain the extent of the power, it becomes necessary to settle the meaning of the word. The counsel for the appellee would limit it to traffic, to buying and selling, or the interchange of commodities, and do not admit that it comprehends navigation. This would restrict a general term, applicable to many objects, to one of its significations. Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more it is intercourse. It describes the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse. The mind can scarcely conceive a system for regulating commerce between nations, which shall exclude all laws concerning navigation, which shall be silent on the admission of the vessels of the one nation into the ports of the other, and be confined to prescribing rules for the conduct of individuals, in the actual employment of buying and selling, or of barter. If commerce does not include navigation, the government of the Union has no direct power over that subject, and can make no law prescribing what shall constitute American vessels, or requiring that they shall be navigated by American seamen. Yet this power has been exercised from the commencement of the government, has been exercised with the consent of all, and has been understood by all to be a commercial regulation. All America understands, and has uniformly understood, the word `commerce,' to comprehend navigation. It was so understood, and must have been so understood, when the constitution was framed. The power over commerce, including navigation, was one of the primary objects for which the people of America adopted their government, and must have been contemplated in forming it. The convention must have used the word in that sense, because all have understood it in that sense; and the attempt to restrict it comes too late." 041b061a72